Changed Countries, Changed Circumstances:
Reopening Removal Proceedings under
8 USC § 1229a
Philip M. Cooper†
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, the decisions of the administrative
state are not always swiftly and effectively realized. Immigration
law often illustrates this disorder. Aliens scheduled for deportation after being denied asylum status can evade removal for
years, creating an interval of time during which their home countries may experience dramatic political and social changes. Government upheavals may precipitate oppression of rival factions,
ethnic violence can endanger cultural groups, and enforcement of
social-planning policies often targets nonconforming families. In
some cases, such national developments present grave, particularized risks to subjects of these countries who face removal from
the United States long after they were initially refused asylum.
Consider a situation in which a childless alien named Maddy enters the United States in 2000 and is denied asylum in 2001. After
avoiding removal, she has children in 2005 and 2006. In 2009, her
home country institutes a one-child policy under penalty of sterilization. Should Maddy be apprehended and deported, she will
face new dangers that were not present during the 2001 hearing.
Given these circumstances, Maddy likely will want to reopen her
asylum application process.
8 USC § 1229a, which governs the removal process, contemplates this particular set of circumstances. Generally, a motion to
reopen asylum proceedings must be “filed within 90 days of the
date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”1 Section 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) offers an exception to the timing rule, however, when the motion to reopen “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to

† BA 2014, University of Minnesota; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1
8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
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which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and
was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”2 If an immigrant slated for
removal after escaping deportation for an extended period can
demonstrate possible eligibility for asylum due to factual developments in his home country, he may be able to reopen his case.
Immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
and federal appellate courts agree that an immigrant wishing to
reopen asylum proceedings under this provision must demonstrate
some shift in national circumstances to satisfy the changed country conditions requirement. A change solely in personal circumstances is insufficient.3 Courts disagree, however, on whether
changes in personal circumstances may ever be considered in assessing the implications of the changed country conditions in a
motion to reopen asylum proceedings. Two circuits have held that
immigration judges must evaluate the effects of changed country
circumstances in light of the petitioner’s situation at the time of
the original deportation hearing. Four other circuits, however,
permit the consideration of “mixed petitions,” which present developments in country conditions alongside the alien’s personal
circumstances at the time of the later motion to reopen proceedings.4
To illustrate this division, recall the earlier hypothetical of
Maddy, who had children after evading deportation and later attempts to reopen her asylum hearing in light of her home country’s new one-child policy. Under the minority rule, Maddy would
be unable to reopen her removal proceedings, as the change in
national policy would have been irrelevant to her at the time of
the initial hearing. The majority rule, however, would permit
Maddy to reopen her proceedings.

2
8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). Department of Justice implementing
regulations closely mirror this statutory scheme, directly borrowing the textual language
of a default ninety-day reopening window with a “changed country conditions” exception.
Relevant regulations do not further elaborate on or define these statutory provisions. See
8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(2)–(3); 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1), (4)(i).
3
See, for example, Yuen Jin v Mukasey, 538 F3d 143, 153–56 (2d Cir 2008) (upholding the BIA’s interpretation of the regulations to require that, once a case is closed, a
petitioner must show changes in country conditions to reopen proceedings, despite language in 8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(D) suggesting that “changed circumstances” alone justify
“consider[ation]” of a successive asylum application); Chen v Mukasey, 524 F3d 1028, 1030
(9th Cir 2008) (upholding BIA requirements that an asylum applicant show changed country circumstances in a similar petition); Zheng v Mukasey, 509 F3d 869, 872 (8th Cir 2007)
(upholding the BIA regulation).
4
See Rei Feng Wang v Lynch, 795 F3d 283, 284, 286–87 (1st Cir 2015) (collecting
cases and “declin[ing] to take a position on a potential circuit split on ‘mixed petitions’”).
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While the particular combination of circumstances necessary
for a mixed petition may arise in only a select number of asylum
cases, the extraordinarily high stakes for affected aliens, as well
as the underlying legal and policy questions, are of great significance. The consequences of deportation often involve political violence, religious persecution, forced abortion or sterilization, and
other life-threatening perils. As declared by Congress and noted
by the courts, it is “the policy of the United States” to “stand[ ]
with the persecuted” and protect fundamental freedoms.5 In
many cases, immigrants have genuinely, not opportunistically,
exercised these freedoms, building complex lives in America and
demonstrating steadfast commitment to new religious and political beliefs.6
These ethical considerations, however, coexist with pressing
administrative concerns. While each asylum applicant may be entitled to fair consideration of his circumstances, nearly seventy
thousand refugees arrived in the United States in 2013, just over
twenty-five thousand of whom were granted asylum.7 This immense administrative task is intensified by the inherent burdens
of reopening cases. Courts recognize that each layer of the asylum
process cuts against the “strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close [ ] promptly,” although this efficiency must be limited by giving the parties “fair opportunity to develop and present
their respective cases.”8 Motions to reopen inevitably increase the
number and complexity of hearings and frustrate conclusiveness,
and “[g]ranting such motions too freely will permit endless delay
of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to establish a
prima facie case.”9 That a portion of the legal rule regarding reopening is unsettled only exacerbates the administrative burden. The
same “aliens creative and fertile enough”10 to manufacture
grounds for reopening may also be more likely to take advantage
5
22 USC § 6401(b). See also Chandra v Holder, 751 F3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir 2014)
(invoking the congressional statement of policy).
6
See, for example, Yu Yun Zhang v Holder, 702 F3d 878, 879 (6th Cir 2012) (discussing a situation in which the woman seeking asylum had remained in the United States
for nearly ten years, converted to Catholicism, married, and had two children).
7
See Daniel C. Martin and James E. Yankay, Refugees and Asylees: 2013 *1 (Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Aug 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/XZ2Q-7B2Q.
8
Bi Feng Liu v Holder, 560 F3d 485, 489 (6th Cir 2009), quoting Immigration and
Naturalization Service v Abudu, 485 US 94, 107 (1988).
9
Abudu, 485 US at 108.
10 Id.
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of jurisdictions with favorable interpretations of the reopening
provisions of § 1229a(c)(7)(C).11 Uncertainty as to the actual rule
also incentivizes otherwise-unnecessary appeals to both the BIA
and federal courts following denial of a motion to reopen. While
fairness matters, finality discourages opportunism, preserves efficiency, and conserves the resources necessary for adjudicating
other claims,12 and thus is equally fundamental to immigration
law. These pressing finality13 and uniformity14 interests, coupled
with the reality that no end is in sight for the complex immigration questions facing the United States,15 make this issue worthy
of consideration.
This Comment addresses the question in three parts. Part I
offers an overview of relevant immigration law before addressing
the specific statutory, regulatory, and judicial rules that control
the asylum process. Part II presents the specific legal issue of reopening removal proceedings, examining the legal and policy considerations and arguments proffered by both sides of the circuit
split. Finally, Part III proposes a novel framework for approaching the issue that would have immigration judges and reviewing
courts consider only those changes in personal circumstances that
predate changed country conditions. Under this approach, Maddy
from the earlier example would be entitled to reopen her case, as
the 2009 change in her home country’s policy came after the
births of her children in 2005 and 2006. Part III then proceeds to

11 8 USC § 1252(b)(2) states that a “petition for review shall be filed with the court
of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” a requirement that allows the location of the original immigration court to dictate
which appellate court can review an agency decision. See also Trejo-Mejia v Holder, 593
F3d 913, 915–16 (9th Cir 2010) (directing “transfer [of] the petition for review [of a BIA
decision] to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit” in accordance with 8
USC § 1252(b)(2)). Under the current divided rule for mixed petitions, an alien has the
option of preemptively bringing a motion to reopen in a favorable jurisdiction. See Bi Feng
Liu, 560 F3d at 487 (noting that the alien “appeared to be forum shopping”).
12 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v Doherty, 502 US 314, 323 (1992),
citing Abudu, 485 US at 107–08.
13 Doherty, 502 US at 323 (noting the importance of conclusiveness in immigration
proceedings).
14 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons
from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 Yale L J F 499, 500 (2014) (“In
the immigration setting, the belief that judicial interpretation should be geared toward
promoting a systemic objective of uniformity has exerted powerful influence over judges.”).
15 See, for example, Kevin Liptak, Obama Calls Caring for Refugees ‘American Leadership’ (CNN, Nov 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RPE6-5VVV (discussing the controversy over accepting Syrian refugees into the United States shortly after the 2015 terror attacks in Paris).
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consider the legal viability, policy implications, and administrative feasibility of the proposed solution.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ASYLUM
Under current US law, asylum is available to “[a]ny alien who
is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the
United States . . . , irrespective of such alien’s status.”16 A successful applicant generally must show that he or she is a refugee, defined as someone “unable or unwilling to return to, and [ ] unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, [his or
her home country] because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”17 The applicant has the burden of proving refugee status,18 and must also
demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.19 While this path to legal residency is available to newly
arrived immigrants, it is also open to aliens who have been in the
country for some time but who initially entered illegally, are facing expiring visas, or are otherwise not qualified for continued
residence. If the immigrant is denied asylum and is not eligible to
remain for other reasons—for example, under the Convention
against Torture20—he may be deported.21
8 USC § 1229a creates a systemic framework for the deportation of unauthorized aliens deemed ineligible for asylum. Initial
removal proceedings “for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien” are held before immigration judges,22 attorneys
appointed by the attorney general who serve within the Executive
Office for Immigration Review under the Department of Justice.23
These judges wield broad power, with the authority to “administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and crossexamine the alien and any witnesses” in making a final determination on whether an alien should be removed or granted asylum.24
16

8 USC § 1158(a)(1).
8 USC § 1101(a)(42).
18 8 USC § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 CFR § 208.13(a).
19 8 CFR § 208.13(b).
20 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, 113 (Dec 10, 1984, entered into force June 26, 1987). See
also 8 CFR § 208.18(b).
21 See 8 USC § 1229a(a)(3).
22 8 USC § 1229a(a)(1).
23 See 8 CFR §§ 1001.1(l), 1003.10.
24 8 USC § 1229a(b)(1).
17
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In reaching a decision, judges may “[c]onsider[ ] the totality of the
circumstances[ ] and all relevant factors,”25 which includes a wide
latitude to make credibility determinations26 based on evidence
ranging from the “demeanor” of the applicant to information from
State Department reports.27
The statute and attendant implementing regulations28 provide a process for reviewing asylum and removal decisions. Immigrants deemed ineligible for asylum and scheduled for removal
have two preappellate methods of challenging an adverse ruling
under 8 USC § 1229a and 8 CFR § 1003.23. The first is a “motion
to reconsider,”29 which permits the alien to file one motion “specify[ing] [ ] errors of law or fact in the previous order . . . supported
by pertinent authority” “within 30 days of the date of entry of a
final administrative order of removal.”30 The second is a “motion[ ]
to reopen,”31 which allows the petitioner to present for consideration “new facts that will be proven at a hearing.”32 Under most
circumstances, this second motion must “be filed within 90 days
of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”33
When the alien is challenging the removal decision as an asylum
applicant, however, this time bar does not apply if the motion to
reopen is “based on changed country conditions arising in the
country of nationality or the country to which removal has been
ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and
would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”34 Regardless of how much time has elapsed since the initial removal decision, demonstration of changed country conditions may entitle an asylum applicant to revisit the deportation
order.
Immigration judges’ decisions are reviewable by the BIA, a
Department of Justice organization with appellate jurisdiction

25

8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(C).
Credibility determinations are of great importance in immigration proceedings,
for an immigration judge’s assessment of whether “testimony is credible, is persuasive,
and refers to specific facts” is “weigh[ed]” in “demonstrat[ing] that the applicant has satisfied the applicant’s burden of proof” in removal proceedings. 8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(B).
27 8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(C).
28 See 8 CFR §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i).
29 8 USC § 1229a(c)(6).
30 8 USC § 1229a(c)(6)(A)–(C).
31 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7).
32 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(B).
33 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
34 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) contains identical language.
26
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over most immigration judge actions, including removal orders.35
The BIA reviews immigration judges’ findings of fact only for
clear error, but reviews de novo “questions of law, discretion, and
judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of immigration judges.”36 Implementing regulations give the BIA the
power, “through precedent decisions, [to] provide clear and uniform guidance to the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service,
the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and administration of the Act and its implementing
regulations.”37 Similarly, 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(7) makes the BIA’s
decisions “final except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney
General,”38 with § 1003.1(g) stating that designated decisions by
the BIA, attorney general, and secretary of homeland security are
“precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”39
8 USC § 1252 permits federal court review of a “final order of
removal,”40 including “review of motions to reopen or reconsider.”41 While the appellate court must “decide the petition only
on the administrative record on which the order of removal is
based,”42 there remains “[j]udicial review of all questions of law
and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States,”
provided that the BIA order is final.43 Courts have interpreted
this statute as granting jurisdiction to review exactly these types
of motions to reopen.44 Courts recognize that the BIA has “broad
discretion, conferred by the Attorney General, to grant or deny a
motion to reopen,”45 and thus are generally hesitant to disrupt
BIA determinations.46 Review therefore proceeds under an abuse
35

8 CFR § 1003.1(a)(1), (b).
8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii).
37 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(1).
38 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(7).
39 8 CFR § 1003.1(g).
40 8 USC § 1252(a)(1).
41 8 USC § 1252(b)(6).
42 8 USC § 1252(b)(4)(A).
43 8 USC § 1252(b)(9).
44 See Cruz v Attorney General of the United States, 452 F3d 240, 246 (3d Cir 2006).
But see Patel v United States Attorney General, 334 F3d 1259, 1261–62 (11th Cir 2003)
(noting that jurisdiction over review of an order denying a motion to reopen is limited by
8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(C), which restricts jurisdiction in cases in which the immigrant committed certain criminal offenses).
45 Kucana v Holder, 558 US 233, 250 (2010) (quotation marks omitted).
46 In extreme cases, however, certain courts have shown a willingness to remand
agency decisions on the factual merits. See, for example, Bromfield v Mukasey, 543 F3d
36
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of discretion standard.47 Obvious agency misinterpretations or
misapplications of law, however, are fully reviewable.48
II. EXPLANATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUE: THE MIXED PETITION
QUESTION
The scope and availability of the “changed country conditions” exception found in 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) and its parallel regulations are presently the subject of a circuit split. More
specifically, federal courts disagree about whether “changed country conditions” can be established by developments in home country
circumstances that have become relevant or threatening due only
to changes in the asylum-seeker’s personal circumstances since
the initial removal order.49 As 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) is the primary opportunity asylum-seekers have to challenge a deportation
decision more than ninety days after a final order, it is frequently
invoked by petitioners challenging removal decisions in both
agency proceedings and federal courts. While this agency-court relationship would appear to be prototypical grounds for a deferencebased resolution, however, judicial skepticism of BIA determinations and aggressive application of the abuse of discretion
standard indicate that such a solution is unlikely. 50
A. The Intersection of Changes in Country Conditions and
Personal Circumstances
The issue of changed personal circumstances typically arises
when an alien has evaded deportation for several years following

1071, 1080 (9th Cir 2008) (holding that “[t]he [immigration judge] erred in failing to find
that the Country Report established that there exists a pattern or practice of persecution
of homosexual men in Jamaica” and remanding the case for further consideration).
47 See Khan v Attorney General of the United States, 691 F3d 488, 495 (3d Cir 2012);
Najjar v Ashcroft, 257 F3d 1262, 1301–02 (11th Cir 2001); Bi Feng Liu v Holder, 560 F3d
485, 489 (6th Cir 2009); Gen Lin v Attorney General United States, 700 F3d 683, 685 (3d
Cir 2012); Beni Tan v Attorney General of the United States, 423 Fed Appx 257, 259 (3d
Cir 2011).
48 See Smith v Holder, 627 F3d 427, 433 (1st Cir 2010) (“A material error of law is
an abuse of discretion.”); Ming Chen v Holder, 722 F3d 63, 66 (1st Cir 2013) (“[W]e review
embedded legal conclusions de novo.”).
49 Compare Khan v Attorney General of the United States, 691 F3d 488, 495, 497 (3d
Cir 2012), and Ying Chen v Holder, 368 Fed Appx 202, 204 (2d Cir 2010), with Chandra v
Holder, 751 F3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir 2014), Shu Han Liu v Holder, 718 F3d 706, 709 (7th
Cir 2013), Yu Yun Zhang v Holder, 702 F3d 878, 880 (6th Cir 2012), and Jiang v United
States Attorney General, 568 F3d 1252, 1257–58 (11th Cir 2009).
50 See, for example, Jiang, 568 F3d at 1257–58.
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the initial removal order.51 In the time between the first and second administrative proceedings, conditions in the alien’s home
country can change dramatically, sometimes for the worse. Government destabilizations or regime changes may result in persecution of members of the immigrant’s political, racial, sexual, or
religious group, with threats sometimes even specifically targeted
at the alien himself.52 Developments in stable political systems
may have the same effect, for heightened scrutiny and suppression of unofficial religious and political groups can pose specific
threats to dissenters and activists.53 Finally, shifts in social programming, such as enforcement of one-child policies, may raise
the specter of sterilization or forced abortions should immigrants
return home.54 Section 1229a clearly permits consideration of
these realities in the interests of protecting potential deportees
from hostile country conditions.55 Courts and the BIA agree that
if the country circumstances at the time of the motion to reopen
would have qualified the petitioner for asylum given his status
at the initial deportation hearing, it is appropriate to reopen
proceedings.56
The same interval of time between the initial removal order
and the motion to reopen also creates opportunities for changes
in aliens’ personal conditions that may put them at odds with circumstances in their home countries. Immigrants can evade deportation for years, giving them time to adopt new religions, become politically active, discover sexual or social identities, marry,
or have children. The BIA and federal courts agree that if these
changes in personal circumstances happen to be adverse to the
status of the petitioner’s land of origin as it was at the time of the
initial removal order, the personal changes alone are insufficient

51

See, for example, Ming Chen v Holder, 722 F3d 63, 65 (1st Cir 2013) (noting that
the petitioner had remained in the country for nine years after the initial removal decision).
52 See, for example, Khan, 691 F3d at 495 (noting that the petitioners’ political party
is “targeted by extremists in Pakistan” and “the Pakistani government is less able to control [ ] violence than” it was at the time of the initial removal decision).
53 See, for example, Ming Chen, 722 F3d at 66–67 (identifying political persecution
as a possible ground for reopening).
54 See, for example, Jiang, 568 F3d at 1257–58 (noting increased enforcement of
China’s one-child policy).
55 See 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
56 See, for example, Malty v Ashcroft, 381 F3d 942, 945 (9th Cir 2004) (noting that
“[t]he [ ] question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner
who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of
future persecution”).
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to reopen proceedings following the ninety-day window.57 The rationale for this is fairly obvious and undisputed. First, the statutory language demands the existence of “changed country conditions” to reopen proceedings after ninety days.58 Second,
permitting changes in personal situation alone to justify reopening proceedings creates a strong incentive for immigrants to
evade deportation for long enough to modify their personal circumstances and manufacture grounds for asylum.59 To have any
chance of reopening proceedings, the petitioner must demonstrate
some change in country conditions.
Courts are divided, however, on whether alterations in personal circumstances may be considered in conjunction with the
requisite changes in country conditions in assessing a motion to
reopen. In several cases, the changes in country conditions would
have been irrelevant to the petitioner as she was at the time of
the initial removal order, but now pose a threat to the alien given
shifts in her personal situation. A common example is a case in
which, between the initial removal order and the second proceeding, an immigrant has converted to a religion of which her home
country has allegedly heightened its persecution.60 Having had
children at a time of increasing enforcement of single-child policies is also a frequent intersection of personal and country
changes.61 Whether immigration judges must consider the petitioner’s present personal condition—or simply her condition at
57 See Yuen Jin v Mukasey, 538 F3d 143, 153–55 (2d Cir 2008) (upholding the BIA’s
interpretation of regulations to require that once a case is closed, a petitioner must show
changes in country conditions to reopen proceedings, despite language in 8 USC
§ 1158(a)(2)(D) suggesting that “changed circumstances” alone justify consideration of an
asylum application); Chen v Mukasey, 524 F3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir 2008) (upholding BIA
requirements that an asylum applicant show changed country circumstances in a similar
petition); Zheng v Mukasey, 509 F3d 869, 872 (8th Cir 2007) (upholding the BIA regulation).
58 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
59 See Ying Chen, 368 Fed Appx at 204 (noting that aliens should not “disregard [initial removal] orders and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal
circumstances”).
60 See, for example, Shu Han Liu, 718 F3d at 709, 712 (noting that the petitioner’s
conversion to Christianity coincided with evidence of worsening religious conditions in
China); Li Zhang v Attorney General of the United States, 543 Fed Appx 277, 284–87 (3d
Cir 2013) (finding that while the petitioner had converted to Christianity since the initial
removal hearing, religious persecution had not materially changed).
61 See, for example, Jiang, 568 F3d at 1254 (noting that the petitioner had given
birth to two children and China had increased enforcement of its one-child policy since the
first deportation order); Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 879, 882 (noting the petitioner’s claim
of intensified “enforcement of China’s coercive population control program in her native
province of Fujian” but finding that the petitioner “failed to demonstrate that country conditions in this respect have worsened in her native province”).
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the time of the initial removal order—in light of changed country
conditions is an unsettled question.
B. The Unavailability of Deference
Deference to agency determinations is unlikely to resolve this
issue. First, Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc62 offers little assistance. While the BIA has rendered
judgments in individual proceedings concerning the general topic
of motions to reopen,63 it has not directly weighed in on the circuit
split, and the only relevant regulations interpreting the statute,
8 CFR § 1003.23 and 8 CFR § 1003.2, simply restate 8 USC
§ 1229a’s text.64 Further, only a narrow subset of BIA decisions is
even entitled to Chevron deference.65 In order to invoke deference,
the opinion must be by the BIA, rather than an immigration
judge,66 and it must be published67 or at least rely on a published
precedential decision.68 No court has yet identified an agency
opinion as worthy of deference on the mixed petition question.
The absence of deference-worthy agency action is secondary,
however, to the larger issue that prevents deference from satisfactorily resolving this question. Put simply, while “[a]s a general
matter, Chevron undoubtedly applies to the BIA’s interpretation[s,] . . . in practice courts have applied Chevron inconsistently
to reach varying results in the immigration context.”69 When
asked to review BIA actions, “the circuits have split on whether
to grant deference to the BIA’s interpretations of procedural provisions in the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)], such as
statutes of limitation or effective date provisions. For example, in
62 467 US 837, 866 (1984) (establishing the now-familiar rule of deference to agencies’ “permissible construction” of statutes).
63 See, for example, Chandra, 751 F3d at 1035–36 (noting that the BIA had denied
the petitioner’s motion to reopen based on its determination that “changes in the [alien’s]
personal circumstances in the United States do not constitute sufficiently changed circumstances so as to allow for the untimely reopening”) (brackets omitted).
64 Compare 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(4)(i) with 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
65 See Stephen W. Manning, Judicial Deference in Immigration Cases *3–4, archived
at http://perma.cc/X5ZP-LABX.
66 See Miranda Alvarado v Gonzales, 449 F3d 915, 924 (9th Cir 2006).
67 Mendis v Filip, 554 F3d 335, 338 & n 3 (2d Cir 2009).
68 See Marmolejo–Campos v Holder, 558 F3d 903, 910–11 (9th Cir 2009) (en banc).
69 Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L 503, 506–07 (2013).
See also id at 517, citing generally Bamidele v Immigration & Naturalization Service, 99
F3d 557 (3d Cir 1996). See also Eamonn Hart, Comment, Citizens All Along: Derivative
Citizenship, Unlawful Entry, and the Former Immigration and Nationality Act, 82 U Chi
L Rev 2119, 2157 (2015) (noting that “Chevron deference to the BIA is applied inconsistently”).
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Bamidele v. INS the Third Circuit” split with three other circuits
in “refus[ing] to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the five-year
statute of limitations contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1256” of the INA.70
Rather than relying on the BIA, the court reasoned that the question “was ‘a general legal concept with which the judiciary can
deal at least as competently as can an executive agency.’” 71 Similarly, “courts have split on whether to defer to the BIA’s interpretations of numerous ‘domestic policy’ provisions in the INA.”72
These disputes range from “disagree[ments] on whether to defer
to the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S)’s ‘relating
to obstruction of justice’ provision”73 to conflicts over “whether the
BIA’s interpretation of the provision ‘single scheme of criminal
misconduct’ is eligible for deference.”74 Commentary by other authors suggests that this inconsistency occurs against the broader
backdrop of “a growing number of federal judges review[ing] decisions by the immigration courts with apparent skepticism,” a
shift prompted by separation-of-powers concerns and worries
about the “institutional competence” of “the administrative immigration courts.”75 A deference-based solution is unlikely to be uniformly predictive or appealing.
This general judicial resistance to yielding to BIA determinations is apparent from a survey of federal appellate decisions on
the mixed petition issue addressed in this Comment. No federal
appellate court has yet identified a BIA decision on this particular
statutory interpretation question as entitled to Chevron deference. Similarly, courts have freely and adamantly second-guessed
the BIA’s application of both § 1229(a) and its mirror-language
implementing regulations under an abuse of discretion standard.
As outlined in this and the previous Section, several circuits have
held that the “BIA abuse[s] its discretion” and “commit[s] legal
error” when the BIA uses the statute and its parallel regulations
to exclude consideration of changes in personal circumstances

70

Chaffin, Note, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 517 (cited in note 69) (citation omitted).
Id at 517–18, quoting Bamidele, 99 F3d at 562.
72 Chaffin, Note, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 518 (cited in note 69).
73 Id, citing generally Alwan v Ashcroft, 388 F3d 507 (5th Cir 2004), and Denis v
Attorney General of the United States, 633 F3d 201 (3d Cir 2011).
74 Chaffin, Note, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 518 (cited in note 69), quoting 8 USC
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
75 See, for example, Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74
U Chi L Rev 1671, 1671–72 (2007) (discussing problems with the application of Chevron
to immigration questions).
71
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when evaluating mixed petitions.76 Rather than follow the BIA,
these courts have independently reached the conclusion that
“[p]ersonal conversion . . . does not foreclose the possibility that a
country can[,] for its own reasons, become more hostile towards
an alien or his group at the same time.”77 Furthermore, circuits
that have upheld BIA rulings on this issue have conducted independent textual interpretation exercises in agreeing with the BIA
decision below.78 While a definitive and coherent revision to
agency implementing regulations might have the power to resolve
this dispute—although the aforementioned judicial approach toward Chevron counsels otherwise—courts’ persistent conclusion
that the correct application of the language at issue dictates a certain result,79 alongside a generally inconsistent and resistant judicial attitude toward deference in the immigration context,
makes deference an improbable and unsatisfactory solution to an
ongoing problem.80
C. Changed Country Circumstances Must Be Evaluated in
Reference to the Immigrant’s Status at the Time of the
Initial Removal Hearing
Two federal appellate courts have taken the minority position
that immigration judges in § 1229a removal proceedings should
consider the effects of changed country circumstances on the alien’s
personal status only as it was at the time of the initial deportation
hearing. The Second81 and Third Circuits82 exclude changes in
76

Chandra, 751 F3d at 1036, 1039. See also, for example, Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at
880 (holding that “the BIA conflated the question of whether there were changed country
conditions with the question of whether Petitioner had made out her prima facie case for
asylum” in applying an abuse of discretion standard); Chandra, 751 F3d at 1038 (“[The
Ninth Circuit] join[s] [its] sister circuits and hold[s] that a petitioner’s untimely motion to
reopen may qualify under the changed conditions exception in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii),
even if the changed country conditions are made relevant by a change in the petitioner’s
personal circumstances.”).
77 Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 880 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
78 See, for example, Khan, 691 F3d at 497–98 (outlining an interpretation of § 1229a
in light of both the BIA’s decision and federal court precedent).
79 See, for example, Jiang, 568 F3d at 1258 (holding that “[t]he BIA clearly abused
its discretion” when it “overlooked” evidence of changed country conditions after concluding that “the [petitioner’s] claim is principally based on . . . changed personal circumstances”); Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 880.
80 As recently as 2015, circuit courts have recognized the ongoing dispute over this
question. See Rei Feng Wang v Lynch, 795 F3d 283, 284 (1st Cir 2015) (noting the existence
of but “declin[ing] to take a position on a potential circuit split on ‘mixed petitions’”).
81 Ying Chen, 368 Fed Appx at 204.
82 Khan, 691 F3d at 495, 497.
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personal circumstance from examination, even when these developments place aliens in significant danger should they be removed. The rationales for this approach include both legal and
policy considerations.
First, these courts interpret the relevant statutory and regulatory language as mandating consideration of changed country
conditions only as they would have applied to the immigrant’s status at the time of the first deportation proceeding. 8 USC § 1229a
and 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(2) offer changed country conditions as the
only basis for reopening proceedings after the ninety-day window.
Under the minority view, this narrow exception implicitly excludes evaluation of personal circumstances that could “undermine the strict limitations on motions to reopen.”83 As all courts
have recognized, alterations in personal circumstances alone are
insufficient to reopen proceedings.84 The circuits on this side of
the split extend this principle one step further, reasoning that if
changed country conditions become relevant only because of
changed personal circumstances, it is really the personal change
that is driving the petition, and thus the statutory exception to
the ninety-day window cannot apply.85 Under this form of but-for
causation analysis, were it not for the change in personal circumstances, the changed country conditions would be fully irrelevant
to the alien’s case for asylum.86
For example, in Li Zhang v Attorney General of the United
States,87 the plaintiff converted to Catholicism while in the United
States during the period following her initial removal order.88 She
alleged that persecution of unauthorized Christian denominations had worsened in her home country of China during the same
period.89 The Third Circuit reasoned that when “changed country
conditions . . . [are] relevant to [an immigrant’s] petition only by
reason of her decision” to act in a way that brings her into conflict with changed national circumstances, the resulting “mixed
petitions—presenting changes in both personal and country
conditions—ordinarily also should be rejected.”90 Similarly, in
83

Li Zhang, 543 Fed Appx at 285.
See, for example, Yuen Jin, 538 F3d at 155; Chen, 524 F3d at 1030; Zheng, 509
F3d at 872.
85 See Khan, 691 F3d at 497–98.
86 Id.
87 543 Fed Appx 277 (3d Cir 2013).
88 Id at 278–79.
89 Id at 279.
90 Id at 285, citing Khan, 691 F3d at 497–98.
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Ying Chen v Holder,91 the Second Circuit interpreted § 1229a
when worsening circumstances for political dissidents in China
coincided with the petitioner becoming a member of the Federation
for Democracy organization, all after her removal order was issued.92 In synthesizing these corresponding developments, the
court held that although “conditions for pro-democracy supporters in China have worsened since the time of the IJ’s decision,
changing one’s personal circumstances in a way that coincides
with changes in one’s country—years after being ordered removed—does not meet the changed country conditions exception
set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).”93
Other legal principles inform this analysis. Courts on this
side of the split frequently note that “[m]otions to reopen immigration proceedings are traditionally disfavored” under current
Supreme Court jurisprudence,94 and therefore should be granted
“only under compelling circumstances.”95 The Court has repeatedly observed that “as a general matter [in removal cases], every
delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes
merely to remain in the United States,”96 heightening the importance of administrative finality.97 The Third Circuit’s decision
in Li Zhang relied on these principles, recognizing that such petitions ought to be “granted only under compelling circumstances”
before rejecting the alien’s assertion that her voluntary membership in a disfavored political group against the backdrop of
heightened persecution justified disrupting administrative procedure.98 According to the minority position taken by the Second and
Third Circuits, immigration law’s emphasis on conclusiveness
urges both a narrow reading of the availability of reopening provisions and limited judicial disruption of finalized removal orders.99
These courts also recognize a strong policy interest in excluding changed personal circumstances from motions to reopen. Most
obvious is the moral hazard problem of encouraging aliens to alter

91

368 Fed Appx 202 (2d Cir 2010).
Id at 203–04.
93 Id at 204.
94 Li Zhang, 543 Fed Appx at 280 (quotation marks omitted). See also Immigration
and Naturalization Service v Doherty, 502 US 314, 323 (1992).
95 Guo v Ashcroft, 386 F3d 556, 561 (3d Cir 2004).
96 Doherty, 502 US at 323.
97 Id at 325–26.
98 Li Zhang, 534 Fed Appx at 280–81.
99 See id at 280.
92
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their personal circumstances in light of changing country conditions in order to manufacture grounds for reopening asylum proceedings. The Second and Third Circuits have noted that “it would
be ironic, indeed, if petitioners . . . who have remained in the
United States illegally following an order of deportation[ ] were
permitted to have a second and third bite at the apple.”100 Examining only changed country conditions removes the incentive for
aliens “to disregard [initial removal] orders and remain in the
United States long enough to change their personal circumstances.”101 The Second Circuit explicitly embraced this rationale
in Ying Chen, finding that a petitioner who had become politically
active since being “ordered removed” should not have “remain[ed]
in the United States long enough to change [her] personal circumstances” after flouting a removal order.102 Consideration of personal circumstances encourages disobedience of administrative
orders and incentivizes opportunism.
D. Courts Requiring Evaluation of Changed Country
Circumstances in Light of the Alien’s Present Personal
Status
The Sixth,103 Seventh,104 Ninth,105 and Eleventh106 Circuits
are more lenient. If a petitioner can demonstrate changed country
circumstances, the decision whether to reopen asylum and removal proceedings must consider these changes in light of the alien’s current personal condition. Again, the courts offer both legal
and policy rationales for this majority position.
This side of the circuit split treats the investigation of
changed country and personal circumstances as separate legal inquiries.107 Rather than examining whether changed country circumstances are made relevant by personal circumstances, these
courts simply inquire whether there are any pertinent changed

100 Khan, 691 F3d at 498, quoting Wang v Board of Immigration Appeals, 437 F3d
270, 274 (2d Cir 2006) (ellipsis and brackets in original).
101 Ying Chen, 368 Fed Appx at 204.
102 Id.
103 See Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 880.
104 See Shu Han Liu, 718 F3d at 709.
105 See Chandra, 751 F3d at 1035.
106 See Jiang, 568 F3d at 1258.
107 See, for example, Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 880 (chiding the BIA for “conflat[ing]
the question of whether there were changed country conditions with the question of
whether Petitioner had made out her prima facie case for asylum”).
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country conditions.108 Under this threshold approach, evidence of
materially changed country conditions alone “clearly satisfie[s]
the criteria for a motion to reopen [ ] removal proceedings.”109 The
Eleventh Circuit offered what is perhaps the most thorough account of this approach in Jiang v United States Attorney General.110 In this case, the petitioner claimed that heightened enforcement of China’s one-child policy was a relevant changed
country condition, even though she had been childless when she
came to the United States and at the time of her initial removal
hearing. Only after disregarding the deportation order did she
marry and have multiple children.111 The Eleventh Circuit, however, disregarded the timing of these events and the fact that her
home country’s actions would have been irrelevant at the first removal hearing. Instead, the court held that as 8 USC § 1229a requires only the existence of changed country conditions, evidence
of relevant national developments alone can “establish[ ] a prima
facie case for asylum and withholding of removal.”112 Provided
that a petitioner technically complies with the “plain language” of
the statutory and regulatory requirement of demonstrating
changed country conditions relevant to her present circumstances, she is at least entitled to reopen the case.113
The Sixth Circuit has employed similar analysis. In Yu Yun
Zhang v Holder,114 the court considered an untimely motion to reopen brought by a petitioner who had converted to Catholicism
and had two children since her removal order.115 These changes
occurred against the backdrop of “intensified [ ] repression of
Christian groups” in the alien’s home country of China.116 In assessing this blend of personal and national developments, the

108 See Shu Han Liu, 718 F3d at 709 (noting simply that the petitioner’s home country
had intensified religious persecution and considering without finding significant that this
persecution was made relevant only by petitioner’s conversion to Christianity).
109 Jiang, 568 F3d at 1254, 1257 (criticizing the BIA for disregarding China’s intensified enforcement of its one-child policy as a clear change in country conditions, despite the
fact that this policy was relevant to petitioner only because of her decision to marry and
have children after the initial removal decision).
110 568 F3d 1252 (11th Cir 2009).
111 See id at 1254.
112 Id at 1258 (discounting the BIA’s finding that the changes in the one-child policy
affected the petitioner only due to changes in her personal circumstances).
113 Chandra, 751 F3d at 1036.
114 702 F3d 878 (6th Cir 2012).
115 Id at 879–80.
116 Id at 880 (quotation marks omitted).

2088

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:2071

court found that “[p]ersonal conversion to a group does not foreclose the possibility that a country can[,] for its own reasons, become more hostile towards an alien or his group at the same
time,”117 noting that “[i]n the instant case, the BIA conflated the
question of whether there were changed country conditions with
the question of whether Petitioner had made out her prima facie
case for asylum.”118 Under this approach, even those changes in
country circumstances made relevant only by new personal circumstances can support a motion to reopen.
The courts adopting the majority position also have identified
policy concerns weighing in favor of permitting mixed petitions.
Given asylum law’s goal of protecting core elements of personal
identity from state-sponsored or state-tolerated persecution, it
makes little sense to discriminate based on the timing of “sincere”
personal changes.119 The Seventh Circuit articulated this disconnect in the 2013 case Shu Han Liu v Holder,120 in which a recent
convert to Christianity pointed to intensified Chinese persecution
of unofficial churches as grounds for asylum.121 The court rejected
the BIA’s assertion that this heightened danger would have been
irrelevant to the petitioner at the time of the initial removal hearing and thus was not a changed country condition for § 1229a purposes.122 Although it recognized “that had [the petitioner] not converted to Christianity she would have no basis for seeking asylum
on the ground that China persecutes Christians,” the Seventh
Circuit nonetheless reasoned that “if her conversion was sincere,
what would be the basis . . . for treating her differently from someone who had converted to Christianity before coming to the
United States?”123 If the goal of asylum is fair treatment of vulnerable aliens, such arbitrary discrimination is untenable.
The Ninth Circuit has similarly recognized that asylum’s fundamental purpose of protecting personal freedoms counsels in favor of permitting mixed petitions. In Chandra v Holder,124 the
court considered the petition of an alien who had converted to

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 880.
Shu Han Liu, 718 F3d at 709.
718 F3d 706 (7th Cir 2013).
Id at 707, 709.
Id at 709.
Id.
751 F3d 1034 (9th Cir 2014).
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Christianity after his removal order.125 Noting that recently intensified persecution by “Islamic fundamentalists [and the] Indonesian
military”126 would severely threaten the petitioner’s right to
“freely choose and exercise [his] own religion,” the court determined that the “worthy policy interest” of personal freedom counseled in favor of permitting mixed petitions.127 Rather than discriminating among petitioners based on when they developed
fundamental aspects of personal identity or demanding that aliens
renounce sincere beliefs, these courts err on the side of allowing
reopening.
III. A MIDDLE SOLUTION TO THE MIXED PETITION QUESTION
This Comment proposes an approach to mixed petitions that
would permit consideration of changes in personal circumstances
since the initial deportation hearing only when these changes
have developed prior to the relevant changed country conditions.
This solution necessarily adopts as a background rule the finalityfocused minority position that certain changes in personal circumstances—under this rule, those that postdate developments
in country circumstances—are irrelevant for reopening asylum
proceedings. It tempers this approach, however, by addressing
the key legal and practical concerns informing the majority rule.
A closely divided circuit split and the compelling rationales supporting both positions suggest that a legally sound, policy-sensitive, and
administratively feasible compromise is ideal.
This solution would come into play in a narrow, but important, set of cases. Consider circumstances in which an atheist
refugee named Krista comes to the United States but is subsequently denied asylum. Rather than complying with the removal
order, Krista instead evades the authorities. Eventually, she is
apprehended and scheduled for removal, but not before she has
converted to Christianity. In the same time frame, however, officials in Krista’s home country have heightened persecution of unofficial religious groups. Krista asserts that this intervening country circumstance change entitles her to reopen removal
proceedings under § 1229a. Under the minority circuit position,
the petition must be denied; if Krista were still an atheist—as she
was at the time of the initial removal hearing—the change in

125
126
127

Id at 1035.
Id (brackets in original).
Id at 1039.
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country status would be irrelevant to her case. Under the majority position, however, Krista would be entitled to reopen her case
as she can demonstrate a change in country conditions that is relevant to her present situation.
The proposed middle approach is more nuanced. If Krista can
show that her conversion predates the adverse shift in government policy, she may reopen her case under the changed country
conditions provision. If she cannot make this showing or if her
conversion postdated alterations in national circumstances, however, the petition would be denied. By sorting petitions on the basis of event timing, this approach creates an administratively
friendly and legally coherent framework consistent with the underlying mechanisms and purposes of immigration law.
A. Legal Justifications for the Middle Position
When viewed independently, the legal rationales given for
each side of the circuit split appear to firmly support their respective positions. Considered as a whole within the context of this
body of law, however, these discrete arguments firmly point to the
viability of the middle solution.
The first point of disagreement concerns the plain meaning
of the statutory and regulatory language at issue. Although
“changed country conditions”128 seems to be an unambiguous
phrase, it is unclear whether these “conditions” are exclusive of
other considerations. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions
on this topic consistently treat the changed country conditions requirement as an independent hurdle that, once cleared, entitles
the petitioner to reopening.129 Conversely, the Third Circuit asserts that the changed country conditions language implicitly excludes evaluation of all other factors and circumstantial changes
from the reopening decision.130 Both sides of the circuit split do
128

8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
See Yu Yun Zhang, 702 F3d at 880 (noting that “separate but simultaneous
changes [in personal and country situations] distinguish these facts from a purely personal
change in circumstances”); Jiang, 568 F3d at 1257–58 (considering only evidence of
changes in China’s enforcement of its one-child policy while ignoring that these developments were relevant to the petitioner only by virtue of her decision to have children since
her initial removal hearing, and discounting the BIA’s finding that the changes in the onechild policy affected the petitioner only due to changes in her personal circumstances).
130 See Li Zhang, 543 Fed Appx at 285 (discussing how consideration of personal circumstances inherently undermines the narrow textual language); Khan v Attorney General of the United States, 691 F3d 488, 497 (3d Cir 2012) (noting that consideration of
changed country circumstances made relevant only by personal changes inherently involves an atextual consideration of personal changes).
129
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agree, however, that some “changed country conditions” must be
present.131 This shared criterion of requiring at least some development in national circumstances is preserved by the mixed approach. It is worth noting that no court has discussed legislative
history or intent in addressing the issue. Indeed, there seems to
be no clear legislative purpose informing this statutory provision—
investigation of its background shows a complicated, fragmented
history with no records of debate or discussion over the relevant
sections of 8 USC § 1229a that cast light on how it should be interpreted with respect to the question of mixed petitions.132 Consequently, a middle position that respects the universally recognized facial requirement of some change in country circumstances
is legally tenable within the boundaries of the circuit split.
Further investigation into the statute’s structure and context
suggests that this Comment’s hybrid solution is a compelling legal approach. The text of similar statutes and regulations in this
area of immigration law implies that different types of changed
circumstances may be grounds for administrative leniency in different situations. For example, 8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(D) permits delays in asylum application filing due to “either the existence of
changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to
the delay in filing an application within the [one-year] period.”133
Although BIA regulations—and validating court decisions—have
held that the changed country conditions provision of § 1229a is
controlling after an initial asylum application has been denied,134
a change in personal circumstances alone may be used to justify
an exception to the time limit of § 1158(a)(2)(B) before final denial.135 The specific inclusion of the term “country” in
131

See note 57 and accompanying text.
8 USC § 1229a grew out of a 1952 law that was relatively strict regarding immigration, setting precise quotas and providing for expedited deportation. See Immigration
and Nationality Act, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified in various sections of Title 8. Subsequent
bills that have extensively updated the entire body of immigration law, including the relevant statute, show a more humanitarian purpose while still maintaining strict procedural rules and the goal of preventing illegal immigration. See, for example, William J.
Clinton, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 32
Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1935, 1937 (Sept 30, 1996) (noting that the bill “strengthens the
rule of law . . . without punishing those living in the United States legally”). There is no
legislative history showing discussion of the changed country circumstances provision.
133 8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
134 See Yuen Jin v Mukasey, 538 F3d 143, 153 (2d Cir 2008) (holding that
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C) is controlling after “entry of a final order of removal [and after] the 90–
day deadline for a motion to reopen”).
135 8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(D).
132
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§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) therefore implies that the word in this context
must narrow the broad circumstantial changes referenced in the
§ 1158(a)(2)(D) exception clause.
Indeed, the textual language of similar regulations further
suggests that the word “country” should be afforded particular
weight in determining the scope of § 1229a’s reopening exception.
For example, 8 CFR § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) allows the government’s
representative in an asylum hearing to rebut the alien’s fear of
future persecution by showing “a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear
of persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality.”136 In applying this rule, courts tend to examine only changes in country
conditions without inquiring into changes in the petitioner’s personal circumstances.137 While the majority side of the circuit split
claims to recognize this linguistic limitation in § 1229a by demanding that the petitioner show at least some change in country
circumstances, this lenient construction undermines the very goal
of the textually heightened country conditions requirement by allowing creative petitioners to take advantage of any change in national circumstances by making corresponding alterations in
their personal situations.138 This Comment’s proposed solution
protects the statute’s plain language purpose of restricting reopening to changed country conditions by ensuring that only developments in national circumstances that become relevant for reasons
beyond the immigrant’s control are considered in a motion to reopen.
Other related statutory provisions enhance the legal necessity of strictly construing the changed country conditions provision in order to protect against opportunistic behavior. 8 USC
§ 1229a(c)(6), which immediately proceeds § 1229a(c)(7)’s motion to
reopen rule, governs motions to “reconsider a decision that the alien
is removable from the United States.”139 In addition to giving the
petitioner only thirty days to file the motion140—a notably shorter
period than the ninety-day window for a motion to reopen141—the
rule offers no saving provision allowing reconsideration outside of
136

8 CFR § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (emphasis added).
See, for example, Singh v Holder, 753 F3d 826, 830 (9th Cir 2014); Kasa v United
States Attorney General, 518 Fed Appx 831, 833–34 (11th Cir 2013).
138 See Li Zhang, 543 Fed Appx at 285, citing Liu v Attorney General of the United
States, 555 F3d 145, 151 (3d Cir 2009) (noting the possibility of “circumvent[ing] regulations designed to limit motions for asylum”) (quotation marks omitted).
139 8 USC § 1229a(c)(6)(A).
140 8 USC § 1229a(c)(6)(B).
141 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
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this time frame. This nearby contextual preference for finality
within the statutory scheme counsels in favor of narrowly construing the availability of reopening.
This persistent emphasis on finality and strict timing rules
also appears in § 1158(a)(2)(B), which requires asylum applicants
to demonstrate compliance with the one-year filing window
through “clear and convincing evidence.”142 As noted earlier in
this Part, § 1158(a)(2)(D) offers a potential exception to this rule
in the case of “changed . . . or extraordinary circumstances.”143 This
lenien-cy, however, is not available as a matter of absolute right.
Instead, “the alien [must] demonstrate[ ] to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances
which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within [one year].”144 This highly discretionary exception
demonstrates that the totality of the circumstances should be considered only in special cases when doing so would not eviscerate
administrative rules. Immigration law’s persistent emphasis on
avoiding opportunism while still permitting holistic evaluation of
exceptional circumstances counsels that this Comment’s middle
solution is legally consistent with the larger statutory and regulatory regime.
Supreme Court precedent on immigration law further indicates that courts consider finality interests to be overcome only
when doing so will not open the door to evasion and manipulation.
The Court has consistently denied attempts to force the attorney
general and the BIA to use their discretion to reopen immigration
proceedings even when the movant technically may be eligible for
relief. For example, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v
Rios-Pineda,145 petitioners “moved [that] the BIA [ ] reopen [proceedings] and requested suspension of deportation” on the
grounds of “extreme hardship” and under a seven-year residency exception.146 Although the aliens technically met the facial requirements for an exception, the Court noted that when the
“Attorney General decides that relief should be denied as a matter

142
143
144
145
146

8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(B).
8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(D).
8 USC § 1158(a)(2)(D).
471 US 444 (1985).
Id at 447.
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of discretion, he need not consider whether the threshold statutory eligibility requirements are met.”147 The Court also emphasized that the petitioners had attained seven years of residency
only by extending their stay through frivolous “appeals [that]
were without merit,” before concluding that refusal to reopen proceedings is particularly appropriate when petitioners have facially qualified themselves for reopening by “prolong[ing] litigation in order to delay physical deportation for as long as
possible.”148 When exceptions to finality encourage “indefinite
stalling” and evasion,149 they are contrary to the fundamental
structure of immigration law. This Comment’s proposed rule,
which permits reopening only when doing so raises no opportunism problems, cleanly fits with Supreme Court precedent.150
A middle approach that allows consideration of personal developments only when they predate changed country conditions
is a compelling legal solution to the problem of reopening asylum
proceedings. This interpretation gives meaning to the presence of
the term “country” in “changed country conditions,”151 preventing
obvious routes for evasion from rendering the word textually irrelevant. The solution is also consistent with its statutory context
and relevant Supreme Court precedent, both of which strongly
emphasize procedural efficiency and finality.
B. Policy Justifications for the Middle Solution
The courts composing the circuit split have raised several policy justifications for their respective positions. This Comment

147

Id at 449.
Id at 450.
149 Rios-Pineda, 471 US at 450.
150 This willingness to relax strict procedural requirements only when doing so will
not invite administrative chaos echoes the Supreme Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence.
In interpreting the strict timing requirements for prisoner challenges under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Court in Holland v Florida, 560 US
631 (2010), found that 28 USC § 2244(d)’s requirement that a “1-year period of limitation
shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus” is subject to equitable tolling.
Holland, 560 US at 634–35, quoting 28 USC § 2244(d)(1). In reaching this conclusion about
the availability of procedural leniency, however, the Court heavily relied on United States
v Brockamp, 519 US 347 (1997), in which it had noted that such exceptions are disfavored
when they “could create serious administrative problems,” particularly if a blanket liberal
rule might expose government agencies to countless meritless claims. Brockamp, 519 US
at 352. See also Holland, 560 US at 646–47.
151 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
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synthesizes these conflicting considerations, creating a compromise approach sensitive to the strongest concerns advanced by
both sides.
The courts adopting the minority position are particularly
worried that consideration of present personal circumstances will
encourage deportable aliens to “disregard [initial removal] orders
and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal circumstances,” incentivizing evasion of law enforcement
and overburdening immigration courts.152 These natural consequences of giving renegade aliens “a second and third bite at the
apple . . . [by] gaming [ ] the system” caution against a relaxed
interpretation of 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C).153 The proposed middle
solution leaves little room for such opportunism. In order for an
alien to intentionally take advantage of changed country circumstances, he would first need to be aware of what these changes
were before altering his personal situation accordingly. While it
is possible that uniquely perceptive aliens could predict future developments in national circumstances and make personal
changes in anticipation, such scenarios seem intuitively unlikely.
A hybrid approach therefore removes the incentive for aliens to
evade removal with the intent of buying time to adversely modify
their personal circumstances.
The middle solution also reasonably satisfies the policy concerns raised by courts adopting the majority position. These circuits contend that excluding consideration of personal circumstances undermines asylum law’s objective of protecting
fundamental expressions of personal identity against the tyranny
of the state. The Ninth Circuit is particularly insistent on this
point, noting that asylum serves the “worthy policy interest” of
defending freedoms such as the right “to freely choose and exercise [one’s] own religion.”154 The Seventh Circuit has similarly argued that when the court determines that aliens’ personal decisions are “sincere,” it is nonsensical to discriminate among worthy
asylum candidates simply on the basis of whether they made genuine personal changes before or after coming to the United
States.155 More specifically, the court has reasoned that if a preimmigration personal change would constitute grounds for asylum, an identical change at an identical time by a different alien
152
153
154
155

Ying Chen, 368 Fed Appx at 204.
Khan, 691 F3d at 498.
Chandra, 751 F3d at 1039.
See Shu Han Liu, 718 F3d at 709.
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who is already in the United States should have an identical effect.156 Creating arbitrary exceptions to reopening asylum proceedings cuts against a strong interest in consistently protecting
human rights.
The hybrid solution is largely responsive to these considerations. First, it inherently captures a larger pool of applicants than
the minority rule, reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s humanitarian
goal of making asylum available to deserving aliens. Second, it offers a viable proxy for discriminating between the Seventh Circuit’s
sincere and insincere changes in personal condition via a mechanism that is considerably more precise than the minority position’s test, which simply looks to whether the relevant personal
circumstances existed at the time of the first removal hearing. As
previously noted, it is highly unlikely that aliens who changed
their personal circumstances prior to national developments are
attempting to exploit the system, so moving the cutoff date for
sincere personal changes from the date of the initial proceedings
to the time when changed country circumstances first emerged
will both enlarge and better define the pool of legitimate applicants.
It is true, however, that the middle position does not fully address the worries of the majority. Under this rule, the possibility
remains that genuine converts, dedicated political activists, and
new parents will be excluded from reopening asylum proceedings
simply because their personal decisions postdate the development
of national conditions of which the aliens may not even be aware.
Unless immigration judges, the BIA, and federal courts wish to
reopen countless cases for the purpose of determining subjective
sincerity, however, this bright-line rule is a necessary result of
protecting the administrative process from opportunism. Indeed,
it is impossible for any effective procedural mechanisms to perfectly achieve “freedom from error.”157 A middle rule that fully responds to the administrative and law enforcement concerns
raised by one side of the circuit split while providing an enhanced
ability to address the policy worries of the opposing side, however,
represents a net improvement that balances efficiency and fairness.
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Id.
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441, 447 (1963).
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C. The Middle Solution Is Administratively Feasible
It would be odd to rely on principles of efficiency and finality
to advocate for a rule that results in increased administrative
costs. The hybrid approach to evaluating changed country circumstances, however, imposes little burden beyond that created by
the minority rule while representing a considerable improvement
upon the majority approach.
First, it is worth noting that if an alien can demonstrate
changed country conditions, the immigration judge is bound to inquire into whether the petitioner is entitled to reopen his case.
Given the mandatory language of the statute,158 it will always be
necessary to assess the impact of these changed country conditions on the personal situation—past or present—of the immigrant, regardless of whether the majority, minority, or compromise rule is selected. No approach can fully bar frivolous
petitioners from at least taking the first step of moving to reopen
proceedings in the presence of new country circumstances. After
the reopening process has started, however, the proposed middle
position provides a useful mechanism for identifying and rapidly
disposing of certain petitions that would otherwise have proceeded under the majority rule.
Under the current system, an untimely petitioner hoping to
reopen his case under the changed country conditions provision
of § 1229a is required to file a motion containing “the new facts
that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted,
[facts that] shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary
material.”159 These new facts must include information pertaining
to the development of national circumstances and the petitioner’s
personal situation, allowing immigration judges to determine
both whether there are actually changed country circumstances
and whether these factors are relevant to the applicant’s status.
For example, in Chandra, the alien alleged that his conversion to
Christianity would expose him to recently “escalated and widespread persecution of Christians by Islamic fundamentalists [and
the] Indonesian military” should he be deported.160 In support of
these claims regarding his personal situation and its relationship
to national events, the petitioner submitted
158 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(ii) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen” and that “[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen” when there are
“changed country conditions”).
159 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(B).
160 Chandra, 751 F3d at 1035 (brackets in original).
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the 2007 International Religious Freedom Report, prepared by
the United States Department of State (“State Department”),
news articles from 2008 reporting on violence perpetrated
by Muslims against Christian religious leaders and followers in Indonesia, a 2009 travel warning issued by the State
Department cautioning “Americans or other Western citizens
and interests” about general terrorist threats in Indonesia,
and other materials. Chandra also presented a letter from
Tara Ongkowidjojo, the Church Administrator at City Blessing
Church in Temple City, California, stating that Chandra “has
been regularly attending [ ] church . . . and attends the Care
Cell Fellowship meeting every week.”161
Other petitioners have produced similarly detailed records of
relevant personal and political circumstances. In Khan v Attorney
General of the United States,162 the petitioners sought asylum on
the basis that their recent involvement in “the Awami National
Party [ ], which is targeted by extremists in Pakistan,” would expose them to political violence that the “Pakistani government is
less able to control . . . than [it was] in 2000.”163 In support of these
allegations, the petitioners submitted detailed information concerning both personal and national circumstances, including “a
report published on July 1, 2009 by the University of Maryland entitled ‘Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan,
and the US,’” along with “a number of articles reporting violence
and instability in Pakistan; a 2009 United States Department of
State Human Rights Report documenting human rights abuses
and politically motivated killings by extremists in Pakistan; information on the treatment of persons with mental illness in Pakistan;
and the petitioners’ medical records.”164
As demonstrated by these cases, petitioners are required to
submit extensive information regarding their personal situations
and relevant changes in their home countries. These data often
include specific and exhaustive details regarding aliens’ political
ideologies, intimate relationships, medical conditions, and religious beliefs, as well as information on country conditions pertinent to the petitioners’ individual statuses.165 Indeed, applicants
may even furnish information specific to their native towns and
161
162
163
164
165

Id (brackets and ellipsis in original).
691 F3d 488 (3d Cir 2012).
Id at 495.
Id at 495–96.
See, for example, id; Jiang, 568 F3d at 1255–56.
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provinces in order to emphasize the nexus between political
events and personal situations.166 This preexisting allocation of
the responsibility for producing persuasive evidence establishing
personal and political circumstances indicates that this Comment’s solution would impose minimal additional burden upon
immigration judges. In addition to furnishing proof of changes in
personal and country conditions, petitioners under the proposed
regime would also have to identify and corroborate the timing and
sequence of these developments. Birth certificates of children,
baptism records, political party donation statements, affidavits of
clergy members and political organization associates, and marriage licenses, in addition to more traditional information sources
such as State Department reports on country conditions, could all
be used to make this showing. Once presented with this information, the immigration judge would then determine whether the
alien could reopen the case based on the timing of the relevant
personal and political changes demonstrated by the petitioner,
applying the proposed hybrid approach to the petition, just as
judges currently apply the minority and majority rules. Rather
than introducing a new layer of complexity into administrative
proceedings, this Comment’s solution simply changes the perspective from which immigration judges will evaluate the presented
facts of each case while also allowing for rapid dismissal of a subset of mixed petition cases.
Of course, while the middle solution proposed in this Comment is most conducive to the resolution of easy cases—such as in
Jiang, in which the refugee had multiple children years before the
heightened enforcement of a one-child policy167—there will inevitably be cases that turn upon murkier facts. Details about exactly
when a petitioner experienced a sincere religious conversion, discovered a sexual orientation, or truly adopted a political ideology
are less easily identified than biological events. These sorts of nuanced inquiries, however, are inherent at all stages of an asylum
system that inevitably requires difficult determinations regarding
the veracity of subjective identities and the sincerity of personal
166

See, for example, Jiang, 568 F3d at 1255–56. The court in Jiang noted that “[the
petitioner] offered previously unavailable evidence that officials in the Fujian Province of
China had increased enforcement of the one-child policy,” allegations supported by “secondhand accounts of the forced sterilization of her sister-in-law and a village neighbor” and
“[testimony] that village officials were aware that Jiang had two children, and [had] told
her parents that family planning policies would be enforced against her if she returned.”
Id at 1255.
167 See id at 1254. For a more complete description of the case, see Part II.D.
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changes. In any sort of immigration case, judges have extensive
fact-finding duties thanks to the vast number of factors that go
into establishing eligibility for asylum, and the immigration system is no stranger to making invasive inquiries and determinations regarding political affiliation, marital status, sexual orientation, and religious devotion. For example, in Bromfield v
Mukasey,168 the Ninth Circuit reached the conclusion that the petitioner “came out as a gay man” four years after he first moved
to the United States, and that this identity subsequently could
qualify him for asylum on the factual basis of both State Department
country reports and the petitioner’s personal testimony about the
state of his homeland.169 Discerning the timing of these changes
in personal circumstances in relation to shifts in country circumstances at the reopening stage, while not always a precise science,
is therefore not an unreasonable expectation. This is especially
true due to the fact that the burden of identifying and proving
details related to the sequence of personal and country changes
already falls on the applicant,170 as well as due to the reality that
these hazy changes in personal and political situations may not
always be so contemporaneous as to create meaningful disputes
over timing.
Indeed, immigration judges have great latitude to interpret
and weigh evidence in making the factual determinations necessary for discerning the timing and relevance of changes in personal and country circumstances. 8 USC § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) offers
a small window into the broad investigative powers of immigration judges, noting that, in an asylum hearing,
a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s
account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or
not under oath, and considering the circumstances under
which the statements were made), the internal consistency of
each such statement, the consistency of such statements
with other evidence of record (including the reports of the

168

543 F3d 1071 (9th Cir 2008).
Id at 1073–74, 1080 (quotation marks omitted) (remanding for the agency to decide
“in the first instance whether [the petitioner] has established that he will more likely than
not be persecuted in light of this pattern or practice”).
170 See 8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(B), (7)(B).
169
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Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to
whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to
the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.171
8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(C) further reflects the wide scope of an immigration judge’s investigative and fact-finding capacities, noting
that credibility determinations in asylum hearings are based on
“all relevant factors” including “the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of
the applicant’s or witness’s account, [and] the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements.”172
The Supreme Court has also recognized the manifold considerations that inform asylum decisions, noting in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca173 the ambiguity and
“case-by-case adjudication” inherent in this area of law.174 While
immigration judges may not ignore or overlook relevant information,175 they have broad discretion to reach decisions based on
evidence that is often unclear or subjective, a power that is particularly relevant for making the timing determinations necessary for this Comment’s proposed interpretation of § 1229(a).
In addition to information on personal and country circumstances furnished by petitioners, immigration judges also have
access to extensive administrative documents detailing the national developments and global affairs that are relevant to motions to reopen, minimizing the need for independent investigation on the dual questions of whether changed conditions exist and,
if so, when they arose.176 For example, annual State Department
reports, congressional committee findings, and even information
published by foreign governments offer reliable data on these
matters.177 These sources, when supplemented with additional details about national conditions furnished by petitioners,178 offer
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8 USC § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
8 USC § 1229a(c)(4)(C).
173 480 US 421 (1987).
174 Id at 448.
175 See Shu Han Liu, 718 F3d at 709 (chiding the Justice Department for overlooking
what the court considered to be basic facts establishing changed country conditions).
176 See id at 707–11 (citing numerous governmental reports on relevant country conditions such as religious and ethnic persecution).
177 See id at 707–08 (relying on each of these sources of information to describe Chinese
religious persecution).
178 See, for example, Jiang, 568 F3d at 1258 (noting that the petitioner had submitted
information specific to her home village about enforcement of China’s one-child policy).
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thorough information on the country circumstances component of
the motion to reopen. Finally, as previously noted,
§ 1229a(c)(7)(B) requires that the petition include supporting
facts regarding the details—and, under the proposed rule, the
timing—of country and personal changes, further easing the burden on immigration judges first in assessing the initial request,
and then later in evaluating cases that survive beyond the reopening stage.179 Although implementation of the hybrid solution may
necessitate some inquiry into the sequence of subjective personal
events that lack definitive temporal boundaries, the petitioner’s
responsibility to identify and prove the timing and order of these
developments, the availability of relevant government-produced
data, and immigration judges’ wide latitude in investigating and
assessing factual claims make such a process feasible.
D. The Hybrid Solution in Action
Examination of illustrative case law reveals that the hybrid
rule would capture deserving petitioners who would otherwise be
excluded by the narrow minority position while simultaneously
protecting the administrative viability threatened by the lenient
majority position. For example, the plaintiff in the 2009 Jiang
case had, since her 1999 removal decision, married in 2002 and
given birth to children in 2002 and 2004.180 In a 2007 petition to
reopen, she cited evidence that “she had recently learned . . . that
forced sterilization and forced abortions were on the rise” in China
and feared the same fate should she return home.181 Although the
one-child policy had nominally been in place for some time, evidence showed that it had only recently been “implemented in [petitioner’s] hometown.”182 This particular timing of events suggests
a genuine change in personal circumstances, minimizing the risks
that the plaintiff was gaming the process. On their face, the timing of these new facts asserted by the petitioner’s filing also
demonstrates compliance with the proposed interpretation of
§ 1229a, allowing rapid determination that reopening is warranted and allowing deserving applicants a second chance to
make a case for asylum.

179 See 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(B). See also 8 USC § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (discussing the
changed country conditions exception).
180 Jiang, 568 F3d at 1254.
181 Id.
182 Id at 1255.
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Conversely, the hybrid rule would foreclose reopening in situations in which aliens are likely attempting to manipulate the
system, thus preventing unnecessary expenditures of administrative time and resources and discouraging opportunistic behavior.
For example, En Gao v Holder183 featured an undocumented alien
who first applied for asylum on the grounds that the Chinese government’s sterilization of his wife, who was still in their homeland
of China, “amounted to persecution of him.”184 After his petition
was denied, plaintiff then moved to reopen proceedings “[o]ne day
after the applicable 90–day deadline” on the basis that “his anxiety
over his impending removal had led him” to convert to Christianity,
and that China’s conditions had become increasingly hostile toward Christians since he first came to the United States—long
before he had become a Christian.185 Applying the same analysis
used in Shu Han Liu, the Seventh Circuit found that even though
the petitioner had only recently converted, he was entitled to
“show[ ] changed conditions in China since the time he [first] left
[China] with respect to the treatment of Christians.”186 By implementing a bright-line rule for reopening, immigration judges
could quickly dispose of potentially manipulative petitions such
as the one in En Gao on the basis of the timing sequence claimed
by the alien in his petition, rather than being forced to begin the
renewed assessment of opportunistic cases that § 1229a is designed to prevent. Though not a perfect proxy for sincerity or a
complete bar to meritless petitions, the middle approach offers a
useful mechanism for rapidly sorting untimely petitions that is in
keeping with the policy goals and administrative realities of immigration law.
CONCLUSION
Immigration law represents a complex series of trade-offs
and balances designed to protect both efficiency and fairness. The
interplay between these competing considerations is particularly
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721 F3d 893 (7th Cir 2013).
Id at 894.
185 Id.
186 Id at 895 (emphasis added). The court acknowledged that the government had not
challenged the “genuineness” of the petitioner’s conversion. Id. The court did, however,
ultimately deny the claim on the grounds that “the Board’s decision [was] supported by
substantial evidence” that the alien had failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of
whether changed country circumstances existed. Id at 894–95.
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apparent in asylum proceedings, for this area of immigration procedure features the twin interests when they are at their most
extreme due to both heightened incentives for gamesmanship in
last-chance motions and the severe risks faced by certain refugees
should they be denied asylum. The current legal status of motions
to reopen is the subject of a dispute that invokes these particular
concerns, as courts are split over whether changes in personal circumstances may be used in evaluating changed country conditions in support of an untimely petition. To date, two circuits consider only the relationship between national developments and
the alien’s status at the time of the first removal proceeding, while
four circuits permit analysis of country conditions in light of the
alien’s current personal circumstances.
A review of the governing statute’s purpose, context, and doctrinal analogues points to the legal viability of a middle solution
that requires consideration of only those personal changes that
preceded country developments. This hybrid rule is consistent
with the rest of the statutory scheme, gives meaning to the full
text of the law, and upholds the legal preference for finality. A
mixed approach also represents a holistic policy improvement,
fully protecting the minority position’s concerns regarding finality
and subversion while substantially incorporating the majority’s
goal of making asylum accessible to aliens who genuinely exercise
personal freedoms. Finally, this rule requires minimal expansion
of administrative burdens, as it merely requires the application
of a new rule without demanding novel fact-finding or procedural
requirements.
Like any complex area of law, this subject would welcome additional academic development. For example, analytic predictions
of the quantifiable consequences of a hybrid rule would provide
useful policy-focused data for evaluating the proposed solution.
Additionally, examinations of how this rule regarding routine deportations might interact with areas of law governed by treaties
such as the Convention against Torture187 may be instructive. For
now, however, the suggested rule offers a strong legal framework
that has practical benefits over the presently divided system.

187

See 8 CFR § 208.18(b) (discussing implementation of the Convention against Torture).

